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Estimating the Relative Speed of RF Jammers in
VANETs
Dimitrios Kosmanos, Antonios Argyriou and Leandros Maglaras
Abstract—Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) aim at en-
hancing road safety and providing a comfortable driving environ-
ment by delivering early warning and infotainment messages to
the drivers. Jamming attacks, however, pose a significant threat
to their performance. In this paper, we propose a novel Relative
Speed Estimation Algorithm (RSEA) of a moving interfering
vehicle that approaches a Transmitter (Tx) - Receiver (Rx) pair,
that interferes with their Radio Frequency (RF) communication
by conducting a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Our scheme is
completely sensorless and passive and uses a pilot-based received
signal without hardware or computational cost in order to,
firstly, estimate the combined channel between the transmitter
- receiver and jammer - receiver and secondly, to estimate the
jamming signal and the relative speed between the jammer -
receiver using the RF Doppler shift. Moreover, the relative speed
metric exploits the Angle of Projection (AOP) of the speed
vector of the jammer in the axis of its motion in order to
form a two-dimensional representation of the geographical area.
This approach can effectively be applied both for a jamming
signal completely unknown to the receiver and for a jamming
signal partly known to the receiver. Our speed estimator method
is proven to have quite accurate performance, with a Mean
Absolute Error (MAE) value of approximately 10% compared
to the optimal zero MAE value under different jamming attack
scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles, capable of navigating in unpre-
dictable real-world environments with little human feedback
are a reality today [1]. Autonomous vehicle control imposes
very strict security requirements on the wireless communi-
cation channels that are used by a fleet of vehicles [2],[3].
This is necessary in order to ensure reliable connectivity [4].
Moreover, the Intelligent Vehicle Grid technology, introduced
in [5], allows the car to become a formidable sensor platform,
absorbing information from the environment, other cars, or
the driver, and feed it to other vehicles and infrastructure so
as to assist in safe navigation, pollution control and traffic
management. The vehicle grid essentially becomes an Internet
of Things (IoT) for vehicles, namely the Internet of Vehicles
(IoV), that is capable of making its own decisions when
driving customers to their destinations [6].
Wi-Fi has become essential for the operation of a mod-
ern vehicle [7]. Wireless communications, however, being
vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [8]. A RF jamming
attack consists of radio signals maliciously emitted to disrupt
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legitimate communications. Such jamming is already known
to be a big threat for any type of wireless network. With the
rise in safety-critical vehicular wireless applications, this is
likely to become a constraining issue for their deployment
in the future. A subcategory of the jamming attacks is the
Denial of Service (DoS) Attack, which is targeting to the
availability of network services. Of special interest are the
mobile jammers, which impose an added strain on vehicular
networks (VANETs). Thus, the accurate prediction of the
behavior of the jammer such as its speed, becomes critical
for providing a swift reaction to an attack. In this work,
we propose a novel metric that captures the relative speed
between the jammer (Jx) and the receiver (Rx). We also
propose the Relative Speed Estimation Algorithm (RSEA) that
is a completely sensorless and passive estimation method that
uses pilot-based received signals at the receiver in order to,
firstly, estimate the channel between the transmitter-receiver
and jammer-receiver, secondly the jamming signal and thirdly,
to estimate the relative speed between the jammer-receiver
using the RF Doppler shift property. This is the first work
in the literature, according to our knowledge, that proposes an
algorithm for speed estimation of malicious RF jammers.
Problem Statement: In addition to RF jamming, wireless
communication between a transmitter (Tx) and a receiver
(Rx) can be impaired by unintentional interference and mul-
tiple access control (MAC) protocol collisions. Jammers can
exhibit arbitrary behavior in order to disrupt and thwart com-
munication with a form of Denial of Service (DoS) attack [9].
In the general case, RF jamming reduces the receiver signal
to interference and noise ratio (SINR), a problem that can be
addressed with classic communication algorithms. However,
in several applications it is critical to detect accurately the
presence of a jammer, i.e. the precise reason behind the
reduction in SINR, the packet-delivery-ratio (PDR), and more
importantly, the nature of the attack. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether the reason for the SINR reduction
is an intentional jamming attack or unintentional interference.
The challenge in detecting an RF jamming attack is that the
information that is available for a jammer is typically minimal
and derives from the useful signal possibly mixed with other
types of arbitrary interference in the area. Estimating the
relative speed between a legitimate vehicle and a jammer, we
can conclude if a high interference scenario has been provoked
intentionally with the form of a DoS attack by an attacker that
approaches the victim or has been provoked unintentionally
by an area with significant RF interference. Specifically, if the
estimated relative speed metric is about 0, we can conclude
that the jammer is moving with about the same speed with the
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Figure 1: The Network Topology in which the orange vehicle
is the jammer that approaches the Tx−Rx pair from a AOP
(θ) angle. This figure also includes the multipath fading effects
by a static object
receiver, having as result the jammer to approach the receiver
at some time instant. On the other hand, if the estimated
relative speed gets a bigger quantity, we can conclude that
the jammer is moving at quite different speeds than this of
receiver. Of particular interest is the higher level behavior of
a jammer, like its motion/movement relative to the Tx - Rx
pair. This information can be effectively utilized in order a
moving DoS attacker to be classified using Machine Learning
algorithms.
Our solution: Using the jamming signal at the receiver
we estimate the relative speed metric (∆u) that is based on
the difference or sum between the velocities of the jammer
and the receiver. This passively estimated metric also includes
information regarding the Angle of Projection (AOP) of the
jammed signal. Our scheme uses only the signal at the
receiver under the presence of a jammer to characterize the
behavior/motion of the jammer (if the Jx is approaching or
moving away from the Rx) using the RF Doppler shift. We
also adopt a pilot-based method for the channel estimation
between Tx - Rx since it is suitable for fast varying channels,
such the VANETs, because the channel is directly estimated
by training symbols or the pilot tone that are known a priori
to the receiver.
The contributions of the paper are three-fold:
• A completely sensorless and passive pilot-based scheme
is proposed that is based on RF communication between
Tx−Rx being interfered by a jammer in the area. How-
ever, we do not apply the proposed RSEA for estimating
only speed of Tx [10]. We try from this point-to-point
communication to gather as much information as possible
regarding jammer’s behavior, such as all the combined
multipath channels among Tx,Rx, Jx, jammer’s relative
speed value and the jamming signal;
• In addition, the proposed relative speed metric defines
physical location features, because is combined with the
AOP of the jammer;
• The effective usage of the estimated relative speed for a
future jamming detection algorithm is outlined;
It has to be highlighted that the proposed RSEA can also
be applied with a completely unknown jamming signal, in
the case where the Tx sends more pilot symbols to the Rx
than the sum of the number of different unknown to the
receiver jamming symbols being sent by the jammer with the
specific value of parameter 2N , which is the double number
of multipath rays in the area for the estimation of both two
channels between Tx−Rx and Jx−Rx.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the related work, whilst Section III analyzes the
network topology, the system model analysis and the wireless
channel model. Section IV presents the location aware relative
speed metric and Section V analytically describes the proposed
RSEA. Section VI presents the experimental evaluation of the
proposed RSEA and provides comparison between different
scenarios. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper and gives
some directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. RF Jamming
RF jamming has been extensively studied in the con-
text of classical 802.11 networks without accounting for
the particularities of car-to-car communications. Besides the
differences in PHY design of 802.11p compared to other
802.11 amendments, the propagation conditions of VANET
are fundamentally different due to the highly dispersive and
rapidly changing vehicular environment. A lot of kinds of
jamming attacks has been studied in VANETs [11]. The two
most important kinds of jamming attacks are the constant
jamming and the reactive jamming. Constant jamming trans-
mits random generated data on the channel without checking
the state of the channel (Idle or not). However, the reactive
jamming jams only when it senses activity on the channel
otherwise it stays idle. In [12] observe that constant, periodic,
but also reactive RF jammer can hinder communication over
large propagation areas, which would threaten road safety.
Reactive jamming attacks reach a high jamming efficiency
and can even improve the energy-efficiency of the jammer in
several application scenarios [13],[14]. Also, they can easily
and efficiently be implemented on COTS hardware such as
USRP radios [15],[16],[17]. But, more importantly, reactive
jamming attacks are harder to detect due to the attack model,
which allows jamming signal to be hidden behind transmission
activities performed by legitimate users [16],[18],[19] . A
different kind of attacks are the pilot-based attacks against
OFDM and OFDMA signals [20]. These attacks seek to
manipulate information used by the equalization algorithm to
cause errors to a significant number of symbols. However,
we do not evaluate this type of attack because the point of
interest of this paper is the DoS attacks that are targeting to
availability and no to integrity. In order to be robust against
pilot tone jamming attacks, OFDM and OFDMA systems
must randomize their subcarrier locations and values. For the
mitigation of this type of RF jamming attack optimal power
allocation with user scheduling are proposed under reactive
jamming in the area [21], utilizing also the technique of
uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) [22]. UFH implies
the communication between transmitter and receiver through a
randomly chosen frequency channel unknown for both agents.
In [23] in order the secrecy level of wireless networks under
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UFH to be characterized, showing the harmful security effect
of broadband eavesdropper adversaries capable of overhearing
in multiple frequencies. To be countered such eavesdroppers,
we consider the use of broadband friendly jammers that are
available to cause interference on eavesdroppers. The goal is
to cause as much interference as possible to eavesdroppers
that are located in unknown positions, while limiting the
interference observed by the legitimate receiver. However, the
information about the location and speed of frienly jammers
are crucial for the above UHF schemes.
B. Localization
A lot of work has covered matters of localization, which is
a fundamental challenge for any wireless network of nodes, in
particular, when nodes are mobile. In [24] the relative positions
and velocities (PVs) are estimated up to a rotation and transla-
tion of an anchor-less network of mobile network, given two-
way communication capability between all the nodes. A least
squares based dynamic ranging algorithm is proposed, which
employs a classical Taylor series based approximation to esti-
mate pairwise distance derivatives efficiently without the usage
of Doppler shifts. In [25], authors propose a dual-level travel
speed calculation model, which is established under different
levels of sample sizes. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are
widely used to maintain the location information and rely on
the tracking service only when their location changes. In the
proposed approach in [26], the problem of tracking cooperative
mobile nodes in wireless sensor networks is addressed with
the Doppler shifts of the transmitting signal in combination
with a Kalman filter, by performing a constrained least-squares
optimization when a maneuver is detected. In [27], authors
suggest a method for joint estimation of the speed of a vehicle
and its distance to a road side unit (RSU) for narrow-band
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) commu-
nication systems. Spatial filtering and a Maximum Likelihood
(ML) algorithm is developed for distance estimation. The
vehicle speed is calculated using a kinematics model based
on the estimated distance and Angle of Arrival (AOA) values.
C. Speed Estimation
Another class of papers proposes speed estimation systems
that alerts drivers about driving conditions and helps them
avoid joining traffic jams using multi-class classifiers. ReVISE
in [28] proposes a multi-class SVM approach that uses features
from the RF signal strength. Using a similar method, MUSIC
[29] is a subspace based AOA estimation algorithm that
exploits the eigen-structure of the covariance matrix of the
received signals on a multi-signal classifier.
Covariance-based speed estimation schemes have also been
used for the estimation of the maximum Doppler spread, or
equivalently, the vehicle velocity that, is useful for improving
handoff algorithms [30]. The authors in [31] proposed an
algorithm that employs a modified normalized auto-covariance
of received signal power to estimate the speed of mobile nodes.
However, the above covariance-based speed estimator uti-
lizes correlation lags to improve performance which comes at
the expense of computational complexity. In [32] an algorithm
that estimates the speed of a mobile phone by matching
time-series signal strength data to a known signal strength
trace from the same road is introduced. The drawback of
the correlation algorithm is the observation that the signal
strength profiles along roads remain relatively stable over
time. However, the results are more accurate than previous
techniques that are based on handoffs or phone localization.
In [33] a method for the estimation of speed for mobile
phone users using WiFi Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and time-
domain features like mean, maximum, and auto-correlation
is proposed. Whilst in [34] two novel autocorrelation (ACF)
based velocity estimators are used, without requiring knowl-
edge of the SNR of the link.
In all the prior work, speed estimators that have been
proposed include training procedures in order to estimate
traffic congestion or other transportation performance met-
rics using sensor measurements. However, speed estimation
problem from wireless RF communication due to security
issues has been not widely investigated. Only, in [35] the
authors try to estimate the AOA of the specular line of sight
(LOS) component of signal received from a given single
antenna transmitter using a predefined training sequence. The
results show the optimality of the training based Maximum
Likelihood (ML) AOA estimator in the case of a randomly
generated jamming signal. However, the drawback of this ML-
AOA estimator is that superior performance is subject to the
availability of a perfect CSI. On the contrary, authors in [36]
introduced a new algorithm to estimate the mobile terminal
speed at base station in cellular networks. This helps BTS in
estimating the channel Doppler shift, using measured received
signals at the Base Station (BS). The Doppler shift estimation
algorithm is improved by utilizing a speed estimation window
that slides over bursts with overlaps and by introducing two
different low and high thresholds for power level comparisons.
The performance of the proposed algorithm is modeled in a
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) network and the simula-
tion has shown acceptable results for a wide range of velocities
and jammers. However, there has been no prior work that
combines a feature of the physical location, such as the AOP
of the Jx with its speed in order to estimate relative speeds
of two moving vehicles (jammer - receiver) during a jamming
attack, using the channel Doppler shift value.
The great majority of the works have used speed estimation
in order to improve handover algorithms between transmitter
and receiver under a typical micro-cellular system with non-
isotropic scattering [10] and for calculating the optimal tuning
of parameters for systems that adapt to changing channel con-
ditions. Our proposed technique is the first in the literature, to
the best of our knowledge, that uses the unicast communication
between Tx and Rx for the prediction of the jammer’s speed
and for future detection of a jamming attack.
III. SYSTEM-MODEL & PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Topology
We consider unicast V2V communication between transmit-
ter and the receiver and a point-to-point V2V communication
between a single jammer and the receiver. This simple scenario
LATEST VERSION 01/01/2019 AT 02:32:26 4
in a rural area is used for the initial verification of our system
without high interference of other vehicles. In this area, a
static obstacle already exists that impacts the communication
between Tx−Rx and Jx−Rx.
The jammer transmits wireless packets/signals that may
form a reactive jamming signal. We assume that the Tx−Rx
pair of vehicles in our model moves with a constant speed
for a period of time. This approach allows the modeling of
platoons of vehicles that are formed by maintaining a constant
distance with each other [1]. We assume that the jammer
moves with a constantly increasing speed with the ultimate
goal to approach the receiver and intervene in the effective
communication zone of the Tx−Rx pair. As it can be seen in
the network topology of Fig.1, the distances between Jx−Rx
in the y axis dy(Jx−Rx) and in the x axis dx(Jx−Rx) together
with the actual distance between Jx−Rx d(Jx−Rx), which is
the hypotenuse of the rectangular triangle that is formed. The
motion of the vehicles in Fig.1 is characterized by the speed
vectors (~uRx, ~uJx, ~uTx). Only ~uRx, ~uTx have the same direction,
which is the direction of the x axis. The jammer approaches
the Tx − Rx with an AOP (θ). So, the speed vector of the
jammer is projected in the axis of the motion of vector ~uRx
with an AOP (θ) Fig.2a. In this figure we also notice that
the AOP (θ) is not equal to zero. Moreover, the angle that
is formed between the speed vector of the jammer ~uJx, and
the wireless signal that travels between the Jx and the Rx, is
called the Angle of Departure (AOD) and is denoted as φ in
Fig.2. In Fig.2a the Line of Sight (LOS) component between
Jx - Rx has a AOD (φ) equal to zero, while the non Line of
Sight (NLOS) component between Jx - Rx has a AOD (φ),
which is different to zero in Fig.2b.
B. System Overview
In our system model, K known pilot symbols that compose
the symbol vector ~xpilot = [xpilot(1)...xpilot(K)]T = [1...1]T
are being sent over consecutive K time instants from the
transmitter to the receiver. At the same time, the jammer
simultaneously transmits over consecutive K time instants K
jamming symbols to the receiver that compose the symbol
vector ~s = [s1...sK ]T . So we consider the received vector at
the receiver ~y = [y(1)y(2)...y(K)]T , which consists of the
combined symbols that the Rx receives from the transmitter
and the jammer at K consecutive time instants. Therefore, for
every time instant n ∈ (0,K] the receiver signal y(n) is the
summation of the pilot symbol sent by the transmitter xpilot(n)
and the symbol sent by the jammer sn. Using pilots, the LOS
channel and the N − 1 NLOS channels between Jx − Rx
are estimated by the receiver. The receiver can also define the
specific value of parameter N , which is the total numner of
multipath rays. The wireless channel is assumed to be constant
for the duration of the transmission of the K pilot symbols
from Tx to Rx.
C. Attacker Model
We consider jammers that aim to block completely the
communication over a link by emitting interference reactively
when they detect packets over the air, thus causing a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack. The jammers minimize their activity to
only a few symbols per packet and use minimal, but sufficient
power, to remain undetected. We assume that the jammer is
able to sniff any symbol of the packet over the air in real-time
and react with a jamming signal that flips selected symbols at
the receiver with high probability (see [37]).
The jammer is designed to start transmitting upon sensing
energy above a certain threshold in order a reactive jamming
attack to be succeed. We set the latter to −86dBm as it is
empirically determined to be a good tradeoff between jammer
sensitivity and false transmission detection rate, when an on-
going 802.11p transmission is assumed. So, the symbol vector
~s that reaches at the Rx from the Jx after K time instants has
the same length as the pilot symbol vector that reaches the Rx
from the Tx after K time instants, provided that the jammer
transmits only when senses a transmission from the transmitter.
Each one of the K scalar values depends on the used power
by the jammer. The jammer continuously transmits with the
same transmission power, with the purpose of overloading the
wireless medium representing, thus a DoS attack [38]. This
work assumes that when the jammer continuously transmits
the same jamming symbol to the receiver forming a simplified
jamming signal of the form ~s = [f...f ]T with length K
and f a random unknown value to the receiver. Furthermore,
the proposed RSEA can operate with completely unknown
jamming signals. This is possible when the Tx sends more
pilot symbols to the Rx than the sum of the different unknown
jamming symbols being sent by the jammer.
Recall that the main goal of this paper is to show how
we can estimate the speed of an non-cooperative malicatious
attacker that can eventually be used as extra useful information
for the design of a RF jamming detection schemes [39].
D. Channel Model
Multipath is the propagation phenomenon that results in
radio signals reaching the receiving antenna by two or more
paths. The multipath scenario illustrated in Fig.1 includes
a static obstacle in order for the multipath effects to be
considered in the communication between Tx - Rx and Jx
- Rx. So, it exists the LOS component of the wireless signal
being sent by the Jx, Tx and also the NLOS component.
In the NLOS component the AOP (θ) is not equal to zero
and the AOD (φ) between the speed vector of the jammer
and the NLOS ray is also not equal to zero (see Fig.2b).
The phenomenons of reflection, diffraction and scattering due
to the multipath give rise to additional radio propagation
paths beyond the direct optical LOS path between the radio
transmitter and receiver.
In our work, we adopt the Rician fading model, which is a
channel model that includes path loss and also Rayleigh fading
[40]. When a signal is transmitted the channel adds Rician
fading. The Rician fading model is particularly appropriate
when there is a direct propagating LOS component in addition
to the faded component arising from multipath propagation.
The Rician channel at time instant t is defined with the
help of multiple NLOS paths, which is similar to the Rayleigh
fading channel but with the addition of a strong dominant LOS
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component. Parameter q defines the channel between Tx−Rx
with q = 1 and the channel between Jx−Rx with q = 2. We
define a complex Gaussian random variable ζG that is uniform
over the range [0, 2pi] and is fully specified by the variance σ2q .
The Rician fading channel can be defined with the help of this
random variable as:
hq[t] =
√
k
k + 1
σqe
j(2pi/λ)(fc+fd,max cosφq)τqδ(t− τq)
+
√
k
k + 1
ζG
(1)
In the above equation, fc is the carrier frequency, fd,max is
the maximum Doppler shift, φq the incidence AOD between
the vector of speed ~uJx with the vector of the jamming
signal, τq = d/c is the excess delay time for the LOS
ray that travels between the two communicating nodes in
channel hq , d corresponds to the distance between the two
communicating nodes and t is the current time instant. The
first term corresponds to the specular LOS path arrival and
the second, to the aggregate of the large number of reflected
and the scattered paths. Parameter k is the ratio of the energy
in the specular path to the energy in the scattered paths; the
larger k is, the more deterministic the channel is [41]. Finally,
(γq =
√
k
k+1σq) in (1) is the complex amplitude associated
with the LOS path, which is known at the receiver. Rician
channel model is often a better model of representing fading
compared to the Rayleigh model.
The channel response ~y after K consecutive symbols sent
by the jammer and the transmitter is:
~y =
N−1∑
l=0
(h1[l]~xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]~s[N − l]) + ~w (2)
In above equation, the ~y is a K× 1 column vector. Moreover,
~xpilot is the symbol vector that the Rx receives from the Tx
after K consecutive time instants and ~s is the symbol vector
that the Rx receives from the Jx after K consecutive time
instants again. The symbol vectors (~xpilot[N − l],~s[N − l])
have the same values, as defined above, for the l different
paths of the respective channels, where ∀l ∈ (0, N − 1].
The ~w represents the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with zero mean. We assume, also, that the jammer and the
transmitter send at very close time instants their symbols at the
receiver, so that h1, h2 channels can remain stable for sending
K symbols. Moreover, N is the overall multipath rays in the
area. For the estimation of this parameter, we use the GEMV
simulator [42]. For describing the modeled area GEMV uses
the outlines of vehicles, buildings and foliage. Based on the
outlines of the objects, it forms R-trees. R-tree is a tree data
structure in which objects in the field are bound by rectan-
gles and are hierarchically structured based on their location
in space. Hence, GEMV employs a simple geometry-based
small-scale signal variation model and calculates the additional
stochastic signal variation and the number of diffracted and
reflected rays based on the information about the surrounding
objects. We must note that the wireless RF communication of
the Tx - Rx pair and the Jx - Rx pair is taking place in a
(a) LOS ray of Jx-Rx communication with φ = 0, θ 6= 0
(b) NLOS ray of Jx-Rx communication with φ 6= 0, θ 6= 0
Figure 2: Illustration of projections of velocities uJx on the
vector ~v. Two-dimensional scheme
specific frequency band, according to the existing standard for
automotive systems[7].
E. Transmission in the MAC/PHY Layer
We assume single carrier communication at the PHY. The
802.11p MAC also provides prioritized Enhanced Distributed
Channel Access (EDCA), and can support applications by
providing different levels of Quality of Service (QoS). In our
model, only the 802.11p MAC EDCA AC[0] channel with
higher priority is used for the pilots. The pilot beacons from
the Tx to the Rx are transmitted with high probability of
successful delivery, increasing the accuracy of the proposed
RSEA at the same time. Any type of collisions at the wireless
channel resulting from competing traffic is addressed by the
MAC EDCA backoff mechanism for distances smaller than
the Carrier Sensing (CS) range of 1000m. So we assume that
our speed estimation algorithm has a correct reaction and for
high interference situations from other vehicles.
IV. LOCATION AWARE RELATIVE SPEED METRIC
One of the main novel ideas of this work, is that we take
into account the physical location of the Jx,Rx nodes and the
direction of their motion when calculating the relative speed
metric. In the general case, the Rx does not move in the same
direction as the Jx (see Fig.1). For this case, ∆u includes the
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AOP (angle θ) of the Jx between Jx and Rx. The geometry-
aware metric takes into account the distance dy(Jx−Rx) and the
distance dx(Jx−Rx). So a rectangular triangle is formed by the
sides dx(Jx−Rx), d(Rx−Jx), dy(Jx−Rx). As it can be seen from
Fig.1, the distance d(Jx−Rx) is the hypotenuse of the rectangu-
lar triangle, which means that cos (θ) = dx(Jx−Rx)/d(Jx−Rx).
So, the speed of the Jx (Source) with respect to the Rx speed,
while the Jx and the Rx are moving in the same direction, is
the relative speed between the two vehicles moving towards
each other and is equal to the sum of their individual speed
vectors ∆~uline = ~uJx + ~uRx. Moreover, ~v = ~uTx||uTx|| is the unit
length vector pointing from the Jx to the Tx. The relative
speed of the Jx and the Rx can be defined as the following
dot product:
∆u = ~v∆~uline (3)
To represent all the speed vectors of Fig.1 in two dimensions
(x, y), we project the vector ~uJx on the unit length vector ~v.
The direction of ~v is the x axis (see Fig.2). The projected
vector is ~uJx cos (θ). On the other hand, ~uRx is already a vector
in the direction of the x axis (see Fig.2), which has the same
direction as the projection of ~uJx. This allows the calculation
of the relative speed between Jx−Rx using the two vectors
(~uJx cos (θ), ~uRx) that have the same direction with the vector
~v.
In (3), if we use the projection vector ~uJx cos (θ) and the
~uRx vector, we get the final version of our metric, which is:
∆u = |~uJx(dx(Jx−Rx)/d(Jx−Rx)) +~uRx| = |~uJx cos (θ) +~uRx|
(4)
This is the ∆u metric in the direction of ~v. The addition is
justified by the fact that the vectors ~uJx cos (θ), ~uRx have the
same direction. In the above equation, ~uJx, ~uRx are the speed
vectors of the Jx and the Rx, respectively. According to our
model, if the Jx approaches the receiver, cos (θ) increases. As
the ~uRx remains constant and the ~uJx is constantly increasing,
(4) is an increasing function and its maximum value indicates
a nearby jamming attack.
As ∆u increases, the jammer approaches the receiver and
when ∆u decreases, the jammer is moving away from the Tx
and the Rx. If the Jx and the Rx are located on the same road,
an actual straight line and the vectors ~uJx, ~uRx, have the same
direction, then our metric is the sum between Jx−Rx speed
vectors (~uJx + ~uRx). Otherwise, if the vectors ~uJx, ~uRx have
opposite directions, our metric is estimated by the difference
(~uJx − ~uRx).
Taking into account the direction of the Jx relative to the
direction of the Rx the general form of the above metric is:
∆u = |~uJx cos (θ)± ~uRx| (5)
It is crucial to point out that the above metric is the actual
value of the relative speed that will be used in the subsequent
sections to model the Doppler shift between the jammer and
the receiver.
V. PROPOSED ESTIMATION SCHEME
A. Estimation of the Combined Pilot/Jamming Signal
The channel between two nodes with jamming is captured
in (2). For the proposed RSEA a pilot-based method for
channel estimation is used. So, the signals that Rx receives
from the Tx and the jammer interfere additively. In (2), if we
differentiate the one LOS component from the other N − 1
NLOS components, we have:
~rLOS = h
LOS
1 ~xpilot[N ] + h
LOS
2 ~s[N ] (6)
Where, the channel values hLOS1 = h1[0], h
LOS
2 [2] = h2[0]
and the symbol vectors ~xpilot[N ], ~s[N ] represent the unique
LOS component of the total N multipath values. If the NLOS
multipath component is added:
~y = ~rLOS +
N−1∑
l=1
(h1[l]~xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]~s[N − l]) + ~w (7)
In (7), the received vector ~y is the convolution between h1
and the pilot symbol vector ~xpilot and the convolution between
h2 and the jamming symbol vector ~s. Moreover, the K × 1
column received vector ~y for the K received values for every
time instant during which the receiver collects every pilot that
is sent from the transmitter is:
~y =
 rLOS[1] +
∑N−1
l=1 (h1[l] + h2[l]s1[N − l])
...
rLOS[K] +
∑N−1
l=1 (h1[l] + h2[l]sK [N − l])
+
 w1...
wK

(8)
To estimate the channel between Tx - Rx (h1), the channel
between Jx - Rx (h2) and the jamming symbol vector ~s, the
best we can do is to estimate the combined vector parameter:
~z =

∑N−1
l=0 (h1[l]xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]s1[N − l])
...∑N−1
l=0 (h1[l]xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]sK [N − l])
 (9)
Vector ~z has the above form for the short time that is
required by the receiver to collect all the K symbols of the
pilot vector. Recall that for a short time duration, the wireless
channel is assumed constant. So for all the K values of vector
~z in (9), the parameters h1[l], h2[l], xpilot[N−l] remain constant
and only the jamming symbols may change depending on the
form of the jamming symbol vector sent by the jammer. We
use a MMSE estimator [43], which finds a better estimate from
least squares (LS), in order the K values of ~z to be estimated:
~ˆz = (~xHpilotC
−1
w ~xpilot)
−1~xHpilotC
−1
w ~y (10)
Cw is the covariance matrix of the noise vector ~w. Vector ~z
in (10) has K components each having N unknown multipath
channel components. So, both the h1, h2 channels can be
estimated and also the K values of the jamming signal ~s can
be estimated too.
If the simplified jamming signal is used1, in which the
jammer continuously sends the same jamming symbol, which
1~s = [f...f ]T
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is unknown to the Rx, we have 2N unknown values for
the two channels h1, h2 with K equations in (9) and one
unknown value for the jamming symbol f . So if the condition
K > 2N +1 is valid, we can see that each one of the channel
values h1, h2 out of N multipath values can be estimated
with the elimination method for the solution of the linear
system with K equations and 2N unknown values in (9). The
values of the wireless channels h1, h2 remain constant for each
value of vector ~z. Moreover, the above linear system can also
be solved with a completely unknown to the Rx jamming
signal, provided that the length of the pilot symbol vector
~xpilot being sent from the Tx to the Rx is larger than the
sum of the number of the unknown jamming symbols with
the value of parameter 2N , which is the double number of
overall multipath rays in the area for the estimation of both
h1, h2 channels. We only utilize the LOS component of the
vector ~z for the estimation of the relative speed metric using
Doppler shift. So, the useful part from vector ~z that we need
for the relative speed estimation through the Doppler shift is
~rLOS = (
 hLOS1 + hLOS2 s1...
hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 sK
). If we only want to estimate
the hLOS1 , h
LOS
2 values of vector ~rLOS without the multipath
values, the above conditions for the solution of the linear
system in (8) can be simplified to K > 4 for the simplified
jamming signal form.
B. Proposed Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Relative Speed Estimation Algorithm (RSEA)
1: N % It is specified by the Tx for the specific area using
the GEMV propagation model.
2: for Every time step (tRSEA) A pilot signal with K =
2N + 2 symbols being sent from Tx to Rx do
3: N % It is re-specified by the Tx for the specific area
using the GEMV propagation model.
4: ~ˆz ← MMSE(~y, C−1w )
5: ~rLOS ← (
 hLOS1 + hLOS2 s1...
hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 sK
) %LOS components
6: if ((K > 2N+1) )) % and ~s has the simplified jamming
signal form then
7: ~ˆrLOS ← (
 hLOS1 + hLOS2 s...
hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 s
) % The ~rLOS and ~z
values can be estimated.
8: rˆLOS[1]− hLOS1 = (a1 + b1j)s
9: end if
10: ∆ˆu Estimation % estimated relative speed value from
(8)
11: end for
The proposed RSEA is presented in Algorithm 1. First, the
Tx specifies the number of multipath rays N in the area
that the GEMV propagation model is used, as explained in
subsection (III). Then, the RSEA is used for every time step
with the transmission of a pilot that consists of K = 2N + 2
symbols. In line 4 of the algorithm the combined channel
between the Tx and the Rx, with the intervention of the
Jx, is estimated from the vector ~y using a MMSE estimator.
Depending on the jamming signal, the inequality that must
be valid for the RSEA system to be resolvable for all the
N multipath values is different. In the final 10th line of the
RSEA, the relative speed value is estimated. A component
rˆLOS[1] of the estimated vector of the combined LOS channels
~ˆrLOS
2 can be combined with the ray-optical baseband complex-
number (a1 + b1j)s1, which is the jamming signal that the
Rx finally receives from the Jx. Specifically, the subtraction
of the channel hLOS1 component from the rˆLOS[1] value can
be set equal to the ray-optical baseband complex-number
(a1 + b1j)s1. The complex number (a1 + b1j)s1 characterizes
the baseband form of the narrowband wireless channel. This
narrowband wireless channel is a function of the relative speed
∆u between the jammer and receiver and the Doppler shift
between the two moving objects.
C. Channel Model with Doppler Shift
In this subsection, we describe in more detail the wireless
LOS combined channel model hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 between Tx
- Rx and Jx - Rx. The tracked LOS components also
show fading characteristics, likely due to the ground reflection
which cannot be resolved from the true LOS. For this reason,
we choose the same model for the LOS component as for
the discrete components. So central to this paper, is the
introduction of the proposed metric ∆u in the channel model
of (1), taking into account the pathloss value at the receiver.
This pathloss value only depends on the distance between
the communicating nodes and usually gets small values for
a narrowband wireless channel. Let us consider the channel
model such as defined by the Rx for a ray transmitted between
two nodes as [44]:
2∑
q=1
hLOSq (t, τq) =
2∑
q=1
γqpoqe
j(2pi/λ)(fc+fd,max cosφq)τqδ(t− τq)
(11)
In the above equation, q defines the channel between Tx−
Rx with q = 1 and the channel between Jx−Rx with q = 2,
γqi is the complex amplitude associated with the LOS path and
poq represents the free space propagation loss [45], λ is the
wavelength, fc the carrier frequency, fd,max is the maximum
Doppler shift that depends on the ∆u metric such as in (3), φq
is the incidence AOD between the vector of speed ~uJx and
the vector of the jamming signal, (τq = d/c) is the excess
delay time that the ray travels between the two nodes, and t
is the current time instant. We assume the LOS case for the
communication between the jammer and the receiver, as can
be seen in Fig.2a. The LOS ray between the Jx and the Rx
has the same direction with the speed vector of the jammer.
2Each one of the K components of ~rLOS has the same combined channel
values
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As a consequence the AOD is equal to zero (cosφq = 1, in
(11)). The observed frequency at the receiver is f ′ = fc(1 +
∆u
c cosφq), which depends on the relative speed ∆u of the
two vehicles (jammer, receiver) that we defined in the previous
subsection. The baseband channel model for a ray transmitted
between two nodes with the intervention of a jammer therefore
becomes:
2∑
q=1
hLOSq (t, τq) =
2∑
q=1
γqpoqe
j(2pi/λ)fc(1+
∆u
c cosφq)τqδ(ti − τq)
(12)
We can see that the Doppler shift ∆f Hz that is observed
in the Rx can be equal with [46]:
∆f =
∆ufc cosφq
c
(13)
And the maximum Doppler shift is:
fd,max =
∆u
c
(14)
Now, let τq be the time that is required for a signal to travel
the distance d. Then, we can re-write hLOS2 from (12) as:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2po2e
j(2pi/λ)fc(1+
∆u
c )
d
c δ(t− (d
c
)) (15)
In the above equation, we use a fc = 5, 9Ghz, which
is the band dedicated to V2V communication. The channel
hLOS2 (t, τ2) is also the channel of a baseband signal in (15)
and if (∆uc >> 1) has the form:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2po2e
j(2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c )
d
c δ(t− (d
c
)) (16)
To get our final signal model, we replace the path-loss
parameter po with equation:
po = G0,p(
dref
d
)np (17)
Where, G0,p is the received power at a reference distance dref ,
which is a standard value at about 100m, np is the path-loss
exponent, which is equal to 2 for the pure LOS links and di is
the distance that the transmitted ray travels between the two
communicating nodes. So, po only depends on the distance d
that the ray travels. We denote ∆t = tRSEAi − tRSEAi−1 as
the time interval between the current time instant and the
preceding one, in which the RSEA is reapplied (tRSEAi−1 ).
Furthermore, if hLOS2 (t, τ2) represents the channel between
the Rx - Jx pair, the distance between the two nodes after the
time interval ∆t is d = ∆u∆t, when the jammer approaches
the receiver. Substituting (17) into (16), hLOS2 can be rewritten
as:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2G0,p(
dref
∆u∆t
)2ej(2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
)τ2δ(t− (d
c
))
(18)
In the above equation, the only unknown parameter is ∆u
at time t. Reorganizing (18) we have:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2G0,p(
d2ref
∆u2∆t2
)δ(t− (d
c
))(cos (ω2)
+ j sin (ω2))
(19)
where, ω2 = (2pi/λ)(fc∆uc )τ2i. In the above equation, the
only unknown parameter is ∆u.
For the LOS channel between Tx−Rx, we know that the
receiver moves with the same speed as the transmitter, such
as a platoon of vehicles with two members. The above means
that the Doppler phenomenon is non-existent. Following (16)
for the formulation of the channel hLOS1 without the existence
of Doppler phenomenon, we can see that this channel only de-
pends on the path-loss component and the complex amplitude
associated with the LOS path. The path-loss component po1
and the complex amplitude variable γ1 can be estimated by
the receiver. So the hLOS1 can be represented by a complex
number:
hLOS1 (t, τ1) = γ1po1e
0 = aTx−Rx + bTx−Rxj (20)
Reformulating the combined value of the LOS channels
(hLOS1 ,h
LOS
2 ) in (12) by combining equations (20), (19), we
have:
2∑
q=1
hLOSq (t, τqi) = γ1po1
+ γ2G0,p(
d2ref
∆u2∆t2
)δ(t− (d
c
))(cos (ω2)
+ j sin (ω2))
(21)
D. Relative Speed Estimation
At this point we have an estimate of the baseband channel
hLOS2 between Jx − Rx, which can be represented with a
complex number. The final baseband signal that reaches at the
receiver after the intervention of the jammer can be represented
as (a1+b1j)s. From Algorithm (1), we know that the jamming
symbols of the symbol vector ~s is part of the vector ~rLOS.
So, if from the estimated combined value rˆLOS we subtract
the channel hLOS1 , which can be estimated by the receiver,
the value (rˆLOS − hLOS1 = hLOS2 s) can be set equal to the
baseband received signal at the receiver:
rˆLOS − hLOS1 = (a1 + b1j)s (22)
From the above equation, as well:
hLOS2 s = (a1 + b1j)s (23)
Reusing the (19) from the previous Section, the ray-optical
baseband complex number (a1 + b1j) can be set equal with:
(a1 + b1j)s = γ2G0,p(
d2ref
∆u∆t2
)δ(t− (d
c
))(cos (ω2)Re(s)
+ j sin (ω2)Im(s))
(24)
where, ω2 = (2pi/λ)(fc∆uc )τ2). The jamming signal ~s
is estimated by the receiver from Algorithm (1). So the
Re(s), Im(s) are known values to the receiver. From the
above equation, we can calculate the desired parameters a1, b1:
a1/(γ2G0,p(
d2refδ(t− ( dc ))
∆u2∆t2
)) = cos ((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
)τ2) (25)
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Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the ∆teff from the
Tx−Rx pair between the Communication Zone and Effective
Zone of the Jx.
b1/(γ2G0,p(
d2refδ(t− (dc ))
∆u2∆t2
)) = sin ((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
))τ2)
(26)
From (25),(26) and with the use of the Euler identity, we have:
cos((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
))τ2)
2 + sin((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
))τ2)
2 = 1
(27)
In (27) there is only one unknown variable ∆u. So, we can
calculate ∆u as:
∆̂u =
4
√√√√G20,pγ22d4refδ(t− (dc ))2
∆t4(a21 + b
2
1)
(28)
From the above equation, we can see that the estimated ∆̂u
value depends on the excess delay time τ2 = dc that is caused
by the Doppler phenomenon.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
Our evaluation scenario is conducted on the outskirts of the
city of Aachen, representing a real-word environment; while
assuming that this is a rural area. Our experimental setup
considers unicast data transmissions in a network consisting
of three nodes: a transmitter, a receiver and a jammer, and
V2X broadcast communication for 10 interfering vehicles
outside of the CS range between the Tx and the Rx (distance
more than 1000m). Two different moving RF jamming attacks
scenarios are evaluated. Analyzing RF Jammer Behavior 1
VI-B, the Tx - Rx pair (see Fig.1) travels with a constant
speed of approximately 50Km/h and with constant distance
of approximately 20m, as a platoon of vehicles. The Jx is also
moving on a side road with zero initial speed and accelerates
to a maximum speed of 60Km/h in order to approach the Tx
- Rx pair. In RF Jammer Behavior 2 VI-C the transmitter
and the receiver travel with constant speed of approximately
48Km/h when the jammer approaches the crossroads, as
illustrated in Fig.3, with accelerating speed and a maximum
limit of 50km/h.
Our experiments are conducted using the Veins-Sumo sim-
ulator [47] with the simulation parameters presented in Table I
such as: The initial distance between the jammer and the pair
of Rx - Tx, dJx−Rx, the distance that separates the receiver
from the transmitter throughout the course of the simulation
dTx−Rx . The closest distance in which the jammer arrives
relative to the Tx - Rx pair as well as the power of all the
transmitted signals PTx,Jx . The time interval ∆t after RSEA
is reapplied. The specific value of the parameter N , which is
the number of the multipath rays. Last, the standard reference
distance dref is used for the estimation of the LOS path loss
component.
As illustrated in Fig.3, there is a time interval ∆teff , in
which the transmitter can effectively communicate with the
receiver. It starts with the ’Start of Communication Zone’ and
ends with the ’Start of the Effective Zone’ of the Jx. After
the start of the effective zone of the Jx, the jammer is located
at distances smaller than 30m away from the receiver and
it can completely jam the communication between the Tx
and the Rx by constructing a ’Black hole’. All the evaluation
parameters are summarized in Table II.
During the performance evaluation we test our proposed
RSEA with different SINR values for two real-life scenarios.
When the jamming vehicle is approaching the Tx - Rx pair,
the SINR is:
SINR =
||h1~xpilot||2
||h2~s||2 + σ2n
(29)
The SINR level is measured by the receiver at the PHY
layer. In the above equation, the noise power σ2n is the noise
power. Moreover, the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) between
the real ∆u value and the estimated is calculated for both
scenarios. This is the difference between the actual relative
speed metric ∆u with the estimated relative speed metric ∆ˆu.
MAE =
1
ns
|∆ui − ∆ˆui| (30)
where i is an integer number that identified with the current
time instant in which the real and the estimated ∆u variable
have a specific value and ns = 10 is the number of measure-
ments for the specific speed value. The MAE value gets its
optimal zero value when the real ∆u is identified with the
estimated. We assume this optimal value as a reference point
for the MAE(%) calculations for the rest of the paper.
B. Results of RF Jammer Behavior 1
In RF Jammer Behavior 1, we assume that the pair Tx -
Rx moves with a high constant speed (50 Km/h) when the
jammer accelerates with a higher maximum speed (60 Km/h),
while transmitting a jamming signal with a simplified form
to the receiver. The first figure of Fig.4a shows a comparison
between the real ∆u and the estimated value. Specifically, by
observing the start time of the steep slope of SINR in Fig.5b,
we can conclude that it coincides with the start of the jamming
attack, the 15.5 sec. The main reason for the sharp decrease
of the SINR in our experiment is the jamming attack and
LATEST VERSION 01/01/2019 AT 02:32:26 10
Table I: Simulation Parameters
Evaluation Parameters in Veins Simulator Values
dTx,Rx 20m
[CW [min], CW [max]] [3,7]
Vehicle’s Transmission Range 130-300m
Initial dJx−Rx 300m
CS range of 802.11p protocol 1000m
Interfering vehicles outside of CS range Tx−Rx 10
dJx−Rx at ”Black hole” 25m
PTx,Jx 100mW
Minimum sensitivity (Pth) -69dBm to -85dBm
fc 5.9GHz
Doppler shift for ∆u = 120km/h ±655.5 Hz
dref 100m
∆t 2s
N 4
Table II: Evaluation scenario parameters
Independent parameters RF jammer 1 RF jammer 2
Tx - Rx velocity 50 Km/h 48 Km/h
Jx velocity 60 Km/h 50 Km/h
∆teff 15.5 sec 18 sec
”Black hole” of communication 13.5 sec 18 sec
Time of ∆u peak 23.4 sec 25 sec
not the interference from the entire environment. Moreover,
in Fig.4a, after 15.5 sec, for which ∆u is above 20 rad*m/s,
the SINR in Fig.4b has also a steep slope. So, the effective
zone of communication between Tx and Rx is approximately
∆teff = 15.5 secs, whilst after that it is corrupted for 13.5
secs. So, the ’black-hole’ in the communication range between
the Tx and the Rx is during the time interval (15.5 secs- 29
secs). After 29 secs, we have the end of the attack. For this
time interval (15.5 secs- 29 secs), the MAE of our proposed
RSEA increases to 23% from the optimal MAE value (see Fig
6).
In Fig.4a, we can see that ∆u reaches a maximum value,
approximately 32.5 rad* m/s, at the time instant 23.4 sec. At
this time, Jx is approaching the Tx - Rx pair in the main road,
which is illustrated in Fig.3. The average MAE for the duration
of RF Jammer Behavior 1 is approximately 13% worse than
the optimal value.
C. Results of RF Jammer Behavior 2
For the second evaluation scenario, we assume that the
pair Tx - Rx travels with constant speed (48 Km/h), which
is almost the same as the maximum speed of the jammer
(50 Km/h) (see Fig.5). The jammer continuously transmits
a random jamming symbol to the receiver. The start time
of the jamming attack is at 18 secs during which the SINR
appears to be decreasing from 5dB to zero while ∆u starts
to increase from 20 rad*m/s to the ’peak’ value of ∆u. The
time that is needed for the Jx to approach the pair Tx - Rx is
approximately ∆teff = 18 secs. After that time, the jamming
attack clearly has perfect results for 18 secs; from the 18 secs
of the simulation until 36 secs, after that SINR increases more
than 5 dB.
If the ∆u slope is positive, the Jx approaches the Rx, whilst
if it goes to zero, Jx is removed from the effective zone of
communication between the Tx and the Rx. The ’black-hole’
in the communication between the Tx and the Rx is around
the time interval (18 secs - 36 secs), during which the MAE
value increases to approximately 18% from the optimal MAE
value.
In Fig.5, we can see that the average MAE for the complete
duration of RF Jammer Behavior 2 is approximately 10%
worse than the optimal value, as it is shown also in Fig.6
D. MAE comparison between RF Jammer Behavior 1 and RF
Jammer Behavior 2
The overall comparison of the MAE results between RF
Jammer Behavior 1 (Jammer 1) and RF Jammer Behavior
2 (Jammer 2) is summarized in Table III. Fig.6 shows that
there is a quite small MAE, only 15% greater than the MAE
value at the start and end of simulation. However, when the
jammer approaches the receiver the MAE shows an increase
of about 23% from the optimal value for RF Jammer Behavior
1 and 18% for RF Jammer Behavior 2. The phenomenon of
the larger MAE at the time of the jamming attack for RF
Jammer Behavior 1 compared to that of RF Jammer Behavior
2 is attributed to the fast varying nature of the ∆u metric,
because it changes with a higher rate and thus, the channel
between the Jx and the Rx changes frequently too. So, the
longer the duration of the jamming attack lasts the better the
MAE results of the proposed RSEA are.
For the duration of the effective ”Communication Zone”
between Tx - Rx (∆teff ) the average MAE was only 8%
worse than the zero MAE value for RF Jammer Behavior 1 and
6% for RF Jammer Behavior 2. As the jammer approaches the
receiver at a distance of approximately 30m, it could success-
fully affect the effective communication between Tx − Rx.
For the time interval of a ”Black hole” in communication
between Tx - Rx, the average MAE increases to 23% from
the optimal value for RF Jammer Behavior 1 and 18% for RF
Jammer Behavior 2. When the overall average MAE, for the
duration of the simulation is measured, an average MAE 13%
worse than the zero MAE value for RF Jammer Behavior 1
is observed and 10% worse than the same reference point for
RF Jammer Behavior 2. An average MAE for our scheme for
all scenarios can be estimated and is about 13% worse than
the optimal MAE value. Finally, it can be concluded from the
simulation results that neither the jamming signal form nor
the different Jx and Tx − Rx pair speeds affect the speed
estimation results significantly. Moreover, the insertion of 10
”hidden” nodes further away from the CS range of Tx−Rx
does not seem to affect the speed estimation values that are
presented. A ”hidden” node occupies the wireless medium
through the MAC/EDCA backoff mechanism (see III-E), in
very rare cases. In these cases, the Tx−Rx communication is
disrupted, forcing the RSEA to use the signal that Rx receives
from this node for the combined channel estimation and finally,
for the ∆u estimation.
In order to test our previous results under more generic
scenarios, the average MAE is estimated for different jammer
speed values and different number of ”hidden” nodes that are
located at the edge of the CS range of the Tx − Rx pair.
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(a) ∆u vs Estimated ∆ˆu to Time
(b) SINR(dB) vs Time(sec)
Figure 4: RF Jammer Behavior 1 results: RSEA with speed of Tx - Rx (50 Km/h) and Jx maximum speed (60 Km/h) and a
simplified form of jamming signal
(a) Real ∆u vs Estimated ∆ˆu to Time
(b) SINR(dB) vs Time(sec)
Figure 5: RF Jammer Behavior 2: RSEA with speed of Tx - Rx (48 Km/h) and Jx maximum speed (50 Km/h) and simplified
jamming signal form
Figure 6: Instantaneous MAE comparison between RF Jam-
mer Behavior 1 and RF Jammer Behavior 2 with simplified
jamming signal form
Specifically we conducted several simulations, for a range of
jammer speed values between [47, 97]Km/h and number of
”hidden” nodes between [0, 50] nodes. For these parameters,
the MAE value increases at approximately 20% from the
reference zero MAE value with the maximum jammer speed
value (see Fig.7b) and at approximately 19, 2% from the
same reference value with the maximum number of ”hidden”
nodes, which is 50 nodes (see Fig.7a). For values greater than
67km/h regarding the speed metric and 30 ”hidden” nodes,
the MAE was increasing with a higher rate. For smaller values
of these two ”side- effect” values, the increase of MAE value is
negligible. So these simulation results indicate that the backoff
MAC/EDCA algorithm, using a safety-related high priority
Table III: RF Jammer Behavior comparison results of
MAE(%) increase from the optimal zero MAE reference point.
Time Intervals MAE (Jammer 1) MAE (Jammer 2)
”Black hole” of communication Tx - Rx 23% 18%
Time Interval of ∆teff 8% 6%
Overall Simulation Time 13% 10%
channel for the communication between Tx − Rx, does not
affect considerably the performance of the speed estimation
algorithm. The jammer’s speed increase, also, affects but not
significantly the proposed RSEA.
VII. DISCUSSION
In Section VI we tested our proposed RSEA under different
SINR values in order to represent realistic conditions. V2X
communication generally uses broadcast messages, but in this
paper we use unicast RF communication between two nodes
in order to perform jammer’s speed estimation. This type of
communication is supported for advanced safety applications
of autonomous vehicles by the Qualcomm’s Cellular Vehicle-
to-Everything (C-V2X) technology [48]. The target of this
paper is to evaluate the performance of the RSEA for a pair
of moving nodes with limited conditions, having as a future
objective to be used in a real-life VANET scenario for more
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(a) Average MAE (%) vs Different number of ”hidden”
nodes (b) Average MAE (%) vs Range of jammer’s speed values(Km/h)
Figure 7: Average MAE(%) increase from the optimal zero MAE reference point with different evaluation parameters: The
MAE of the proposed RSEA with different number of nodes for the contention window of the MAC backoff procedure for
the wireless channel bettween Tx - Rx and different jammer’s speed values.
than one pair of nodes. Peer to peer networks in vanets are
studied lately in many other works [49]–[51], focusing mostly
on social networks message exchange, cooperative caching or
unicast video streaming.
Relative speed estimation results from our proposed RSEA
can be collected from a Trusted Central Authority (TCA) that
exists in the area. Analyzing these collected data records,
the TCA make deductions based on the SINR value, notify
approaching vehicles and even propose jamming free routes
[52].
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented an algorithm for estimating
the combined value ∆u of the relative speed between Rx
and Jx in combination with the AOP of the Jx, during
a jamming attack. A simplified jamming signal is sent to
the receiver by the jammer, that contains the same unknown
symbol to the receiver K times. An entirely unknown jamming
signal can also be estimated by the receiver at the proposed
algorithm, too. The proposed relative speed metric can capture
both the speed of the jammer and its direction relative to
the Tx - Rx movement. By predicting the above value, we
can understand jammer’s behavior, for which Rx does not
have any information except for the combined signal that is
received from Tx and the interference caused by the attacker.
Our proposed RSEA uses the physical metric of ∆u from RF
communication Tx−Rx in order to estimate the direction of
the attacker. This metric is combined with the SINR value
from the hardware (physical layer) in order for a real-life
VANET scenario to be simulated. The MAE measured is being
approximately only 10% worse compared to the optimal zero
MAE value under different jamming attach scenarios.
As future work, we plan to combine RSEA with other
metrics from the PHY layer or the network layer, such as
SINR, for developing an accurate cross-layer jamming detec-
tion scheme. The detection scheme will be capable to deal
with more than one pair of nodes that communicate in a
broadcast form. This combined metric can be also used as
an extra feature in a machine-learning approach (see [53]), in
which the vehicles of the area can be classified as cooperative
or malicious, thereby forming a trusted vehicular network.
The usage of the relative speed metric can also reduce false
alarms and can provide additional information about the future
position of a Jx, such as the time that the attacker will
approach the effective zone of communication. The above in-
formation extracted from our channel based Jx - Rx analysis,
can decrease false alarms compared to jamming prediction
schemes that are based only on the 802.11p PHY/MAC related
metrics (see the DJAVAN in [54]), concluding the physical
geographical topology of the attacker. Last but not least, this
metric is appropriate for a variety of jamming attacks.
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